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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE: THE LIMITS OF COMMON LAW
LIABILITY FOR NEWSGATHERING
Sandra S. Baron
Hilary Lane
David A. Schulz*
Media lawyers have recently been confronted with a relatively new source of
litigation: the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations, which aris-
es out of confidentiality agreements. In this Article, the authors identify the ele-
ments of tortious interference with contracts and examine the key issues presented
when this tort is applied to newsgathering. The authors then consider a potential
defense based on the First Amendment. In light of the public and constitutional
interests at stake, the authors conclude that the breach of a confidentiality agree-
ment should not sustain a tortious interference claim when the press is involved in
newsgathering activity.
INTRODuCTION
The revelation that CBS had decided not to air an interview with a for-
mer tobacco executive on the news magazine program 60 Minutes sent me-
dia lawyers across the country scrambling to understand the tort of inten-
tional interference with contractual relations, a little-litigated tort in the
media context. This Article addresses some of the many questions raised by
the CBS announcement about the applicability of that tort to newsgathering.
We first lay out the elements of the tort of intentional interference with
contractual relations and then identify the key issues presented when this
tort is uprooted from its traditional commercial context and applied to
newsgathering activity. Finally, the parameters of a potential First Amend-
ment defense to this tort are sketched out for media lawyers to consider and
develop if plaintiffs indeed seek to expand this tort to sanction
newsgathering.
° Sandra S. Baron is the Executive Director of the Libel Defense Resource Center;
David A. Schulz and Hilary Lane are New York-based litigators with the media practice
group of the law firm of Rogers & Wells. The authors gratefully acknowledge the valu-
able assistance of Mark Anderson, David Clancy, John Nathanson, Sig Sorenson, and
Howard Suh of Rogers & Wells in the preparation of this Article.
An earlier version of this Article was published by the Libel Defense Resource
Center in January 1996 as a monograph entitled Tortious Interference: A Practical
Primer for Media Practitioners.
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The absence of much directly relevant case law attempting to apply this
tort to newsgathering activity may itself reflect a recognition that the tort
has no proper application to traditional newsgathering techniques. Part I
illustrates that the societal needs that gave rise to the recognition of this tort
at common law have nothing to do with restricting the flow of newsworthy
information. Part II reviews the elements required to make out a claim for
intentional interference. As developed by the judiciary over the past century,
the necessary elements indicate that this is not an area in which news orga-
nizations should be overly concerned that significant new liability will be
imposed on accepted newsgathering techniques. Finally, Part III proposes a
constitutional defense available to members of the press confronted with
intentional interference claims.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TORT
A. The Common Law Roots of Tortious Interference
The tort of interference originally developed as a means of protecting
employers from the actual damages they suffered through the loss of the
services of irreplaceable employees. As Professor Dan Dobbs has noted, the
tort has its doctrinal roots in medieval cases allowing a master to recover for
the loss of services of his servant against an interfering defendant who beat
or otherwise caused injury to the servant.' Over time, courts relaxed the
original limitations that allowed recovery only in cases involving actual
physical violence and independently wrongful conduct.
In 1853, in the English case of Lumley v. Gye,2 the modem concept of
interference with economic expectancies took shape. In that case the court
upheld a claim for liability for inducing an opera singer to cancel an en-
gagement by offering a higher fee.' The tort was for "wrongfully and mali-
ciously" interfering with a personal service contract with notice, regardless
of the means used.4 In other words, the tort simply was enticing a laborer
to leave a pre-existing employment contract. In subsequent cases, this tort
was expanded beyond personal service contracts and extended to prospective
relationships not yet reduced to a signed agreement.'
Uprooted from its historical limitations, the tort evolved to one with
theoretically universal application: liability could exist for intentional inter-
' Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 335, 338 (1980).
2 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
3Id.
4 Id. at 756.
5 See Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expec-
tancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 64 (1982).
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ference with any economic relationship, unless some privilege or justifica-
tion existed for the interference.6 The potential sweep of the tort and the
confusing analysis of burdens and defenses that grew up around it repeated-
ly led to calls for re-examination and reform. In 1923, Francis Sayre pub-
lished a sweeping indictment of the tort, calling for its reformulation.7 Calls
to rethink the elements of the tort and the burdens of proof again gained
strength in the mid-1960s, causing the American Law Institute to discard the
prima facie tort approach contained in the original Restatement of Torts in
favor of a balancing approach requiring that the defendant's conduct first be
shown to be "improper."8 In reluctantly approving a new restatement of the
tort in 1979-126 years after Lumley v. Gye-the American Law Institute
drafters continued to complain that the "law in this area has not fully con-
gealed but is still in a formative stage."9
In short, as Professor Perlman concluded, notwithstanding its long histo-
ry, "doctrinal confusion [about this tort remains] pervasive, both within and
among jurisdictions."'"
B. Elements of a Cause of Action
The tort of interference with contract thus is not a tort with clear ele-
ments and boundaries. At bottom, the tort requires intentional, unjustified
interference with an existing economic relationship. The Restatement defines
liability under interference with contract as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) be-
tween another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the contract, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to
the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract."
6 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
" Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 672
(1923).
8 Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766B (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, introductory note
to ch. 37, at 6-7 (1979); Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995) (re-
counting development of the tort).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, introductory note to ch. 37, at 5.
0 Perlman, supra note 5, at 64; see also David A. Anderson, An Errant Tort, 9
REV. LmG. 409 (1990).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766.
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The Restatement, however, notes that the tort is still so ill-defined that
"[i]nitial liability depends upon the interplay of several factors and is not
reducible to a single rule; and privileges, too, are not clearly established but
depend upon a consideration of much the same factors."' 2
There is considerable disagreement even as to which party has the bur-
den of pleading and proving key elements of the tort, such as whether the
plaintiff must show impropriety in the defendant's conduct, or whether the
defendant is left with the burden of showing a justification for the interfer-
ence. 3 The general rule is that the plaintiff's proof of an intentional act
causing disruption of an economic relationship shifts to the defendant the
burden of proving that the interference was privileged or justified. 4 Some
states, though, require the plaintiff also to prove lack of justification. 5
However the burdens are allocated, the Restatement definition of the tort
raises three issues: (1) what types of existing relationships give rise to liabil-
ity for interference; (2) what does it mean to interfere "intentionally"; and
(3) what constitutes "improper" interference causing the third person not to
perform. Unlike many other intentional torts, these considerations necessari-
ly incorporate into the elements of the tort an evaluation of motive, intent,
and social policy in order to determine whether conduct was "improper" or,
to the contrary, "justified." This tort thus raises issues akin to the amor-
phous concerns presented in deciding whether private information is actually
"newsworthy" or would be "beyond the bounds of decency" to republish.
Nevertheless, the tortious interference analysis is more problematic than the
privacy tort because so many varied actions may be challenged and so many
competing policy concerns need to be weighed.
As Part II will show, the need to weigh both motives and social policies
in making a determination of liability underscores the strong arguments
available within the common law elements of the tort itself to defeat claims
asserted against the press.
12 Id. introductory note to ch. 37, at 5.
13 Id. introductory note to ch. 37, at 5-6.
'4 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 129, at 983 (5th ed. 1984).
"S See, e.g., Swager v. Couri, 395 N.E.2d 921, 925-26 (111. 1979); Top Serv. Body
Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Or. 1978); Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 907 (1979).
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II. LIMITS ON PRESS LIABILITY CONTAINED IN THE TORT ITSELF
A. The Prerequisite of a "Valid Contract"
Courts unanimously hold that a contract or proposed contract that is
illegal or contravenes public policy is void, and an action cannot be main-
tained either for its breach or for inducing its breach. 6 Therefore, a first
line of defense against a claim of tortious interference based upon
newsgathering activity lies in the purposes justifying use of a valid existing
contract or prospective contract. 7 Where an employer-imposed confidenti-
ality agreement operates to prohibit the disclosure of information relating to
illegal conduct or threats to the public safety, health, or welfare, or other
information of public interest, it may contravene public policy and therefore
not form a valid basis for a tortious interference claim.'"
An agreement may be held to be against public policy if it is injurious
to the interests of the public, contravenes an established interest of society,
violates a statute, tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety, or is in
conflict with the morals of the time. 9 Although an agreement that operates
to conceal evidence of illegal activity, misconduct, or danger to the public
16 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 994 & n.68; see also Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406-09 (1911) (holding contract illegal
under common law restraint of trade and Sherman Antitrust Act); Gold v. Wolpert, 876
F.2d 1327, 1332 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding contract invalid under New York law due to
violation of real estate law and thus foreclosing tort action); NCH Corp. v. Share Corp.,
757 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law to find that contract against
public policy could not form basis of tort); Shamblin v. Berge, 212 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316
(Ct. App. 1985) (holding that one cannot recover for contractual interference without a
valid contract); Colorado Accounting Machs., Inc. v. Mergenthaler, 609 P.2d 1125,
1127 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (finding contract that is illegal under state statute cannot
form liability for tort); W.H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 127 N.W. 803, 808 (Mich.
1910) (holding contract void because it violated common law prohibition of restraint of
trade); Behnke v. Hertz Corp., 235 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Wis. 1975) (finding contract that
is illegal under state statute cannot support tort claim).
17 The Restatement discusses both interference with contract and with prospective
contractual relations as grounds for liability. The factors set out for the torts are essen-
tially the same, but have a different weight where a contract exists because of "the
greater definiteness" of plaintiff's expectations and his stronger claim to rights under it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. e; see also id. § 767 cmt. j (noting that
"greatir protection is given to the interest in an existing contract than to the interest in
acquiring prospective contractual relations, and as a result permissible interference is
given a broader scope in the latter instance").
• See it § 774.
'9 Marvin N. Benn & Assocs. Ltd. v. Nelsen Steel & Wire, Inc., 437 N.E.2d 900,
903 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
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welfare would seem to accomplish most if not all of these objectives, our
research revealed no decisions squarely addressing the enforceability of such
an agreement.
Nevertheless, substantial authority underscores a strong public policy
that favors the disclosure of information relating to criminal activities or
other violations of the law. Such policy would support an attack on the
validity of non-disclosure agreements, at least in some contexts.20 Cases
dealing with the enforceability of employer confidentiality agreements also
focus on the strong public policy against restricting the ability of employees
to seek gainful employment utilizing non-proprietary knowledge gained
through prior employment.21 These cases provide a framework for evaluat-
ing the interests that an employer may legitimately seek to further through a
non-disclosure agreement and the types of information that may be protect-
ed. Each line of authority may be instructive on the enforceability of non-
disclosure contracts.
1. Disclosure of Wrongful Conduct
Courts recognize the danger posed by agreements requiring employees
to remain silent about illegal practices. As the Supreme Court observed in
Branzburg v. Hayes,22 "it is obvious that agreements to conceal information
relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from
the standpoint of public policy."'23 A confidentiality agreement that operates
to conceal information relating to criminal activities clearly is unenforceable
and void because "[i]t is public policy ... to encourage the disclosure of
criminal activity."' According to Williston, "[a]ny bargain, express or im-
plied, having for its purpose or consideration the concealment or compound-
ing of a crime is unlawful."' Were the rule otherwise, "[a] party bound by
contract to silence, but suspecting that its silence would permit a crime to
go undetected, would be forced to choose between breaching the contract
and hoping an actual crime is eventually proven, or honoring the contract
while a possible crime goes unnoticed."26 Although the reported decisions
adopting this principle generally involve agreements not to prosecute, the
policy is no less applicable in the context of confidentiality agreements. In
both cases, the agreements operate to conceal information of public concern.
2 See infra part I.A.1.
21 See infra part II.A.2.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
23 Id. at 696.
' Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972).
25 14 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1718 (3d ed.
1972) (citation omitted).
26 Lachman, 457 F.2d at 854.
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In Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,27 a federal district court as-
sessed the validity of a confidentiality agreement in the context of pre-trial
interviews of former employees. The court observed that when such agree-
ments operate to conceal underlying events leading up to disputes of poten-
tially illegal practices, enforcement "can be harmful to the public's ability to
rein in improper behavior and in some contexts the ability of the United
States to police violations of its laws."'  As such, the court held that
"[a]bsent possible extraordinary circumstances not involved here, it is
against public policy for parties to agree not to reveal, at least in the limited
contexts of depositions or predeposition interviews concerning litigation
under federal law, facts relating to alleged or potential violations under such
law. 29
In McGrane v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, ° another federal district court
reviewed in dicta the assortment of doctrines that address the public interest
in assuring protection for persons with inside information concerning wrong-
doing where a cover-up is involved. The court noted that arrangements to
cover up criminal wrongdoing may violate 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after
the fact), § 4 (misprision of felony), § 371 (conspiracy to defraud), §§ 1341-
1346 (mail and other fraud), or §§ 1501-1517 (obstruction of justice).3 As
it further observed, "[c]ourts are increasingly reluctant to enforce secrecy ar-
rangements where matters of substantial concern to the public-as distinct
from trade secrets or other legitimately confidential information-may be
involved."32 In support of this observation, the court cited judicial access
cases and several government reports.33 Additionally, the court cited the
First and Fourteenth Amendment protection of public employees' rights to
raise matters of public interest without being subjected to adverse job conse-
quences.'
The public policy against discouraging employees from disclosing in-
formation relating to misconduct, criminal activities, or other threats to the
public welfare also is embodied in "whistleblower" decisions. It has long
27 159 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
2 Id. at 444.
29 Id.
822 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
31 Id. at 1046 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 371, 1341-1346, 1501-1517 (1994)).
32 Id.
33 Id. (citing Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Meyer Goldberg, Inc.
v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 823 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Commanche Peak and Rancho Seco
Nuclear Power Plants: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); FIFTY-
NINTH REPORT BY THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No.
991, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)).
34 Id. at 1045-46.
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been recognized that employees who blow the whistle on their employer's
wrongdoing should be protected from retaliation due to the public interest in
encouraging such disclosure. 35 As described by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,36 "'public policy favors
the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge
thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy."' 37
Increasingly, state courts have found a public policy exception to at-will
employment relationships that may also be relevant to the enforceability of
confidentiality agreements. Traditionally, at-will employees could be termi-
nated by the employer for any cause. 3' For example, in Palmateer, an em-
ployee brought an action for retaliatory discharge claiming he had been
terminated for supplying information to a local law enforcement agency that
a fellow employee might be violating the criminal code for agreeing to gath-
er further evidence implicating the employee, and for intending to testify at
the employee's trial.3 9 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action and the appellate court affirmed.' The Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed, finding that the employee stated a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge in violation of the "clear public policy favoring
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses."'"
In addition to common law protections, by 1993 thirty-five states had
passed statutes to encourage those with insider knowledge to report organi-
zational misconduct without fear of retaliation.42 Certain federal statutes
also provide legal recourse for employees terminated in retaliation for re-
porting wrongdoing. 43 These statutes vary widely with respect to the desig-
nation of appropriate recipients of whistleblowers' reports. Some specifically
identify the entity to which disclosure must be made-typically a govern-
mental agency-while others are silent on this issue." At least one court
has found that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) protects
See Terry M. Dworkin & Elletta S. Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media:
When Is a "Source" a "Sourcerer"?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357 (1993).
1" 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
17 Id. at 880 (quoting Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ill.
1980)).
38 Some states have even extended the exception to employees working under collec-
tive bargaining agreements or other contracts. See Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs.,
23 F.3d 1444, 1447 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 319 (1994); Dworkin &
Callahan, supra note 35, at 373-78.
'9 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
o Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 406 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980),
rev'd, 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
41 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
42 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 35, at 361.
43 See id. at 365.
" Id.
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persons reporting directly to the media.4" In that instance, the court held
that "the broad remedial purpose of the Act mandates that an employee's
communications with a newspaper reporter regarding conditions of the
workplace are protected. 4
6
These cases and statutes establish a strong public policy to encourage
employees to reveal information about employers' wrongdoing and miscon-
duct. An agreement that operates to conceal such information therefore may
be challenged as contravening public policy and thus void. Unfortunately,
defining further types of information that cannot be suppressed properly re-
mains problematic. Beyond information relating to criminal or illegal activi-
ty, case law provides little guidance as to the specific parameters for en-
forceable disclosure agreements concerning other types of information of
public concern.
2. The Scope of an Employer's Legitimate Interests
The enforceability of a confidentiality agreement also depends upon the
interest an employer seeks to protect. 7 Typically, employers advance an
interest in protecting trade secrets or other proprietary information in order
to preserve a competitive advantage. Courts require such agreements to be
reasonably related to the protection of pertinent information, and will not
enforce overly broad agreements.4"
Enforceability of a nondisclosure provision in an employment contract
will depend upon whether, given the particular facts of the case, the re-
straints imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's
business from unfair or improper, competition. 9 "The reasonableness of the
restrictions is measured by their effect, if any, on the general public, the
extent of the hardship imposed thereby on the restricted party and whether
they are necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of the former
employer."5 Nondisclosure agreements that are too broad and unreasonable
have been found to be void and incapable of supporting a cause of action
for tortious interference."
' See Donovan v. R.D. Andersen Constr. Co., 552 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (D. Kan.
1982).
4 Id. at 253.
7 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
41 See id.; Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 1977).
4' R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
see also Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Columbia Ribbon
& Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 369 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1977).
so R.R. Donnelly, 767 F. Supp. at 1264.
Id.; see also NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 757 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1985); Equifax
Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 491, (Ga. Ct. App.
1994), cert. denied, No. $95C0728, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 560 (Ga. Apr. 14, 1995). The fact
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These holdings primarily are rooted in the strong public policy against
restraints of trade and the high value placed on an individual's ability to ply
his trade.52 Nevertheless, these cases demonstrate that courts will limit the
types of information that can be protected by such agreements. As a general
rule, the interest the employer seeks to protect must be legitimate and the
agreement must be narrowly tailored to protect that interest.53 Where the
asserted interest is the protection of the employer's business from unfair
competition, courts generally require that the restriction be no greater than
that necessary to protect the proprietary interests of the employer.54
The decision as to what interests are properly protected appears to turn
on whether the information qualifies as a trade secret. Although the standard
for identifying trade secrets varies from state to state, typically the analysis
involves an examination of the degree of effort required to develop the
information and the extent to which the employer sought to keep the infor-
mation confidential. For example, in R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Fagan,55
a federal district court refused to issue an injunction to enforce a confidenti-
ality agreement that purported to protect information that the court consid-
ered "vague, contradictory and conclusory, '56 finding insufficient evidence
to prove that the information which the employer sought to protect was
entitled to protection as a trade secret under Illinois law.57 The court found
that the sales, marketing, and pricing practices at issue did not qualify as
trade secrets and thus did not warrant protection.58 The court also declined
to find customer lists to be confidential information entitled to protection
because, although such lists may, under certain circumstances, qualify as
confidential information, the names of the employer's customers were readi-
ly available through directories.59 By contrast, in Ecolab Inc. v. Paolo,'
another federal district court enforced an agreement restricting confidential
that an employee receives post-employment compensation for complying with the provi-
sion does not make the restriction more reasonable or enforceable. G&W Elec. Co. v.
Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 468 N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (111. App. Ct. 1984). Rather, en-
forceability is determined by how relevant and necessary the agreement is to the protec-
tion of a former employer's legitimate interests. Id. Thus, if the former employer does
not have a legitimate protectable interest or the scope of the agreement is unreasonable,
a compensation provision is irrelevant. Id.
" Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind, 151 N.E.2d 609, 610 (N.Y. 1958) ("Absent a
breach of confidence, an employer cannot exact from a former employee an agreement
to refrain from putting to use the experience gained while working at his trade.").
5 See Columbia Ribbon, 369 N.E.2d at 6.
4 See id.; see also Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (II1. App. Ct. 1984).
55 767 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
16 Id. at 1269.
57 Id. at 1266.
58 Id.
19 Id. at 1267.
6o 753 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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information that was specifically defined to include customer lists, sales re-
ports, and price lists. 61 The court found that this information qualified for
protection as trade secrets under New York law in part because it was kept
confidential by the company, it was developed with considerable effort by
the employer, and it could not be developed by a competitor without a simi-
lar expenditure of effort.62
These cases establish that the information suppressed by a confidentiali-
ty agreement must correspond to the legitimate interest the employer seeks
to protect through the agreement. No reported cases appear in which a court
specifically refused to enforce a confidentiality agreement because an em-
ployer had no legitimate interest in suppressing information of public con-
cern. Nevertheless, the fact that courts limit the enforceability of such agree-
ments to the protection of competitive information supports an argument that
an employer has no proper interest in protecting from disclosure information
relating to wrongdoing, potential health hazard, or other misconduct. Just as
limiting the dissemination of information for anticompetitive reasons is not a
legitimate purpose, neither is employing a nondisclosure provision to con-
ceal information relating to illegal activity or other conduct detrimental to
society.
This analysis suggests that an agreement that operates to conceal infor-
mation of substantial public concern may be held void and thus would not
form the basis of a tortious interference claim.
3. Voidable Contracts
A contentious issue in tortious interference suits arises when the under-
lying contract is not void but is nonetheless voidable or potentially unen-
forceable. The question then becomes whether such a defective contract can
support a claim for tortious interference. Voidable contracts are those where
"one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do
so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification of
the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance. 6 3 A contract may be
voidable by reason of the statute of frauds, formal defects, lack of consider-
ation, lack of mutuality, infancy, unconscionable provisions, or even uncer-
tainty of particular terms.' This issue could be of some importance, for
example, where an agreement was entered into under duress, and thus was
"voidable," but not "void."
61 Id. at 1104.
62 Id. at 1111-12.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1979).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 14, § 129, at 995.
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Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, voidable contracts support a
claim for tortious interference.65 The rationale for this result is that a prom-
ise may be valid and subsisting even though it is voidable, and such promis-
es cannot be interfered with until the contracting party formally repudi-
ates." Legal commentators also adopt this position.67 Case law, however,
is split over this issue.68
Courts have on occasion reviewed "voidable" employment contracts in
the context of tortious interference claims, most notably when the contract is
voidable under the statute of frauds. Although jurisdictions differ, courts
usually permit such contracts to form the basis of a claim.69 By contrast, in
Lauter v. W & J Sloane, Inc.,7° a federal district court dismissed an inter-
ference claim, holding that a contract was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds, and thus could not support such an action because no allegations
were made that, but for the interference, the employee and the company
would have adhered to the contract despite its unenforceability.7" Instead,
the court noted from the evidence that the company would have repudiated
the contract. 72
A line of New York cases built upon Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker
Hardware Manufacturing Corp.73 attempts to bridge the gap between the
Lauter decision and the Restatement position by carving out limited excep-
tions as to when a voidable contract can support a tortious interference
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f.
"Id.
67 See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 995-96.
6 For cases following the Restatement, see Barnes Group, Inc. v. C&C Prods., Inc.,
716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983) (statute of frauds); Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So. 2d 825
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (lack of mutuality); Consolidated Petroleum Indus., Inc. v.
Jacobs, 648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of frauds); Speer v. Continental
Oil Co., 586 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (statute of frauds). For cases that find
that there is no liability for tortious interference under a voidable contract, see Dwight
v. Tobin, 947 F.2d 455 (11th Cir. 1991) (statute of frauds); Stanley v. Kelley, 422
N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (terminable at will); Kopp, Inc. v. United Technolo-
gies, Inc., 539 A.2d 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (statute of frauds).
69 See, e.g., Friedman & Fuller v. Funkhouser, 666 A.2d 1298, 1309 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1995) (holding contract containing confidentiality provision voidable because the
statute of frauds can still afford a basis for a tortious interference claim); see also NCH
Corp. v. Share Corp., 757 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1985); Barnes Group, 716 F.2d at
1027; Kemper v. Worcester, 435 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Il. App. Ct. 1982) (quoting WIL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 932 (4th ed. 1971));
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989) (citing KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 14, § 129, at 995-96).
' 417 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
71 Id. at 262.
2 Id.
-3 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980).
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claim. The Guard-Life line of cases holds that liability will result from in-
terference with an at-will contract only when some independently actionable
misconduct is present.74 For example, in Huebener v. Kenyon & Eckhardt,
Inc., an employee brought suit against his supervisor alleging interference
with an oral employment agreement deemed voidable under the statute of
frauds. Affirming the dismissal of the claim, the appellate court described
the Guard-Life approach as follows:
In Guard-Life. . . , the applicable rule with regard to con-
tracts terminable at will was set forth in the following
words: "Where contracts terminable at will have been in-
volved, we have upheld complaints and recoveries in actions
seeking damages for interference when the alleged means
employed by the one interfering were wrongful, as consisting
of fraudulent representations, or threats or as in violation of
a duty of fidelity owed to the plaintiff by the defendant by
reason of a relation of confidence existing between them.
Absent some such misconduct, no liability has resulted to
one whose actions have induced nonperformance of a con-
tract deemed to be voidable and thus unenforceable."76
Because the employment contract was voidable under the statute of frauds
and the plaintiff did not allege any independently wrongful conduct on the
defendant's part, no liability under the tort was allowed. In reaching this
conclusion, the court observed that "[i]t would require a strained reading of
the allegations of the complaint indeed to find that they sufficiently set forth
language supporting a recovery under any of the narrowly defined circum-
stances permitting such recovery set forth in Guard-Life."77
Under this authority, therefore, a claim for tortious interference based on
a voidable confidentiality agreement will not be permitted to proceed absent
evidence of wrongful conduct. Similarly, the Lauter decision suggests that
when an employee would have repudiated the voidable agreement even in
the absence of any interference, no claims for tortious interference exist.
Nevertheless, in light of the conflicting views among jurisdictions, and even
7 Id. at 448; see also Perry v. International Transport Workers' Fed'n, 750 F. Supp.
1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Huebener v. Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., 534 N.Y.S.2d 952 (App. Div. 1988);
Yan's Video, Inc. v. Hong Kong TV Video Programs, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App.
Div. 1987).
71 534 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
76 Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
r Id.
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among courts within a single jurisdiction, it is not clear whether voidable
confidentiality agreements can support a tortious interference claim.
B. Intentional and Improper Interference
As noted, tort liability for interference with contract generally requires a
showing that the defendant acted intentionally and improperly to interfere
with the contract.78 Generally, "[t]he interference with the other's perfor-
mance of his contract is intentional if the actor desires to bring it about or if
he knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a
result of his action," whereas the determination of impropriety requires a
detailed examination of the circumstances surrounding the alleged interfer-
ence.79 Each of these common law factors is interrelated and gives rise to
several potential defenses for press defendants.
1. "Intentional" Interference
Technically, the intent requirement is satisfied by demonstrating that the
defendant "acts with knowledge that interference will result."8 According
to the Restatement, the interference need not be the defendant's sole or even
primary goal. Rather, "[t]he rule applies ... to an interference that is inci-
dental to the actor's independent purpose and desire but known to him to be
a necessary consequence of his action."'"
Notwithstanding this broad formulation, courts often consider the extent
to which a defendant was motivated by a desire to induce a breach of con-
tract, as opposed to the breach being incidental to another purpose. As the
Restatement acknowledges:
If the actor is not acting criminally nor with fraud or vio-
lence or other means wrongful in themselves but is endeav-
oring to advance some interest of his own, the fact that he
was aware that he will cause interference with the plaintiff's
78 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note
14, § 129, at 978; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council,
Inc., 968 F.2d 286, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1992); Schmid, Inc. v. Zucker's Gifts, Inc., 766 F.
Supp. 118, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Hanzel Constr., Inc. v. Wehde & Southwick, Inc.,
474 N.E.2d 38, 43 (Il. 1985); Schott v. Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376, 379 (II. 1982); G.S.
Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1991); United
Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. 1990); Guard-Life Corp. v.
S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1980).
7' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A cmt. e.
go KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 982.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j.
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contract may be regarded as such a minor or incidental con-
sequence and so far removed from the defendant's objective
that as against the plaintiff the interference may be found to
be not improper.82
For example, in Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Associates, Ltd.,83 an announcer
who narrated a political commercial claimed, among other things, that the
subsequent use of his voice in an opponent's political commercial tortiously
interfered with his contract with the organization that had retained him to
narrate the original commercial. The court found no intentional interference
with the plaintiff's contract because any interference that occurred "was
merely incidental to defendants' exercise of their constitutional rights. Their
purpose was a legitimate, political one and did not involve an intent to in-
terfere with plaintiff's business relationships. '
Although decisions excusing "incidental" interference purport to assess
the actor's intent to interfere, the analysis in the end usually turns upon a
more general evaluation of the actor's motive and the interest he sought to
further by the challenged conduct. These factors are considered in many
jurisdictions as part of the analysis of whether an interference is "improper"
rather than "intentional.""5 Other jurisdictions consider these factors under
the rubric of justification or privilege. 6 In any event, there is a compelling
argument to be made in any action brought against the press that the breach
of a confidentiality agreement is incidental to the legitimate goal of gather-
ing and disseminating news of public interest, and therefore is not subject to
tort liability.
2. "Improper" Interference
The impropriety of an interference is essential under any formation of
the tort.87 "It has always been agreed that a defendant might intentionally
interfere with the plaintiff's interests without liability if there were good
grounds for the interference, or in other words that some kind of unaccept-
able purpose was required in addition to the intent." 8 The difficulty lies in
differentiating proper interference from improper interference.
82 Id.
520 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
4 Id. at 309; see also Health-Chem Corp. v. Baker, 915 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
1990); Alvord & Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Constr. Co., 385 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (N.Y.
1978).
15 See infra parts II.B.2.b, II.B.2.d.
" See id.
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766.
88 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 983.
1996] 1041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Standards applied by courts vary widely. The Restatement seeks to cata-
logue the various factors that have been taken into account in determining
whether an alleged interference is sufficiently "improper" to sustain liability.
The seven factors identified by the revisers of the Restatement are:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the societal interests in protecting the freedom of action
of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.8 9
Courts applying the Restatement have sought to balance these factors to
reach a fact-specific determination as to the propriety of specific behav-
ior.' The issue presented in every case is whether the conduct should be
permitted without liability, despite its effect of causing harm to another,
when all of the relevant factors are considered.91
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767.
0 See, e.g., Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984); Italian & French Wine Co. v. Negociants USA, Inc., 842
F. Supp. 693, 700 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Hursey Porter v. Bounds, No. 93C-01-091, 1994
WL 762670, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994); United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson,
313 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Minn. 1982).
91 Even when the Restatement formulation is not specifically applied, courts general-
ly weigh the same competing interests to decide whether the conduct was "justified" or
"privileged." See, e.g., Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 648 (Alaska 1991);
Hanzel Constr., Inc. v. Wehde & Southwick, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 38, 43 (I11. App. Ct.
1985). Some jurisdictions vary the definition of liability, requiring a showing that the
interference was improper in either motive or means. See, e.g., United Truck Leasing
Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23-24 (Mass. 1990); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply
Co., 733 P.2d 430, 434 (Or. 1987); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d
293, 303-04 (Utah 1982). Cases applying this standard suggest that either motive or
means is sufficient to support liability. A defendant's motives are improper where his
"predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d. at 307. A
defendant's means are improper when they are contrary to law, "such as violations of
statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules." Id. at 308; see also United
Truck Leasing, 551 N.E.2d at 23-24.
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a. Nature of the "Conduct"
The Restatement and many courts consider the actor's conduct to be the
most important consideration.92 There is, however, no specifically pro-
scribed conduct that will result in liability.93 Rather, conduct potentially
supporting a claim runs the gamut from mere persuasion to independently
illegal acts. Although conduct that exerts no influence or pressure should not
give rise to liability, "any conduct conveying to the third person the actor's
desire to influence him not to deal with the other" may be actionable in the
traditional commercial context of the tort.94 It is not necessary to show in-
dependently tortious or illegal means to establish liability because "the de-
fendant may be held [liable] even for peaceable persuasion" so long as the
interference is deemed "'improper' under the circumstances." 95
As a review of the case law makes abundantly clear, analysis of any one
of the Restatement factors is always interrelated to consideration of the other
factors. Thus, under identical circumstances, some conduct will be permitted
while other conduct will be improper; likewise, identical conduct may be
permissible under certain circumstances while wrongful under others. The
issue is not simply whether the actor is justified in causing the harm, but
rather whether he is justified in causing it in the precise manner in which it
was caused.96
Notwithstanding the interplay of all the factors, a few general statements
may be made about the types of conduct likely to result in liability. First,
although there is no requirement that the defendant's conduct be indepen-
dently actionable, illegal conduct almost certainly will satisfy the "improper"
element of the tort.' Indeed, it is possible that independently tortious con-
duct will be held sufficient to impose liability regardless of the interest the
actor seeks to further through his actions. According to Prosser and Keeton,
"Methods tortious in themselves are of course unjustified and liability is
appropriately imposed where the plaintiff's contract rights are invaded by
violence, threats and intimidation, defamation, misrepresentation, unfair
competition, bribery and the like." 98
See, e.g., Kand Medical, Inc. v. Freund Medical Prods., Inc., 963 F.2d 125 (6th
Cir. 1992); Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 448
(N.Y. 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (noting that
"[tihe nature of the actor's conduct is a chief factor in determining whether the conduct
is improper").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k.
94 Id.
95 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 982-83.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
9 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 992 (footnotes omitted); see also RE-
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In the commercial context even affirmative conduct that is not indepen-
dently tortious may be actionable as a tortious interference.99 Liability for
non-tortious conduct turns on the purpose of the alleged interference. The
offer of a better price or better terms alone has been held sufficient to satis-
fy the requirement of impropriety in a commercial context.1
An offer to indemnify the contracting party against liability in order to
obtain its breach for competitive purposes has also been held to be action-
able. 1 For example, in Edward Vantine Studios, Inc. v. Fraternal Com-
posite Service, Inc.,1°2 the appellate court found that a photographer im-
properly induced fraternity and sorority houses to breach their agreements
with a competing photographer when he offered to indemnify them for any
legal costs resulting from the breach. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the competitive environment justified his offer to indemnify:
"Our acceptance of such a tactic would render the notion of sanctity of
contract a nullity and would indicate that a contract could be breached with
impunity merely by having the party inducing the breach assume the finan-
cial consequences of such a breach."' 3
At least one court, however, has held that an offer to indemnify can be
justified under certain circumstances in which identifiable legitimate inter-
ests were at stake. In Hursey Porter & Associates v. Bounds," a real es-
tate agent claimed that a bank tortiously interfered with the agent's listing
agreement with a seller of real estate. The agent claimed that the bank,
which had liens on the property and was entitled to receive all proceeds of
the sale, improperly agreed to indemnify the seller for any commission it
might be obligated to pay the agent. 5 The bank and the seller disagreed
as to whether the agent was legally entitled to the commission, and the
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(a) cmt. c (observing that "physical violence,
fraudulent misrepresentation and threats of illegal conduct are ordinarily wrongful
means and subject their user to liability even though he is free to accomplish the same
result by more suitable means").
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. m; KEETON ET AL., supra note
14, § 129, at 990.
100 See P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Martinez, 823 F. Supp. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Co-op. Creamery, Inc.,
195 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959); Top Value Enters. v. Carlson Mktg.
Group, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
101 See Edward Vantine Studios, Inc. v. Fraternal Composite Serv., Inc., 373 N.W.2d
512, 515 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Jim-Bob, Inc. v. Mehling, 443 N.W.2d 451, 462 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1989); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976, 982 (Mo.
1953).
102 373 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
103 Id. at 515.
104 No. 93C-01-091, 1994 WL 762670 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994).
1o5 Id. at *3.
1044 [Vol. 4:3
LIMITS ON COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR NEWSGATHERING
seller refused to sell unless the bank provided the indemnity."9 The court
concluded that the indemnification could not be characterized as improper
because the bank had a legitimate interest in preventing the agent from
receiving a commission to which he was not legally entitled, and because
the bank could protect its interest in the proceeds from the sale of the prop-
erty only by providing the indemnity." 7
In the newsgathering context, this principle suggests that an indemnity
agreement provided by the press to a source who breaches a confidentiality
agreement could be deemed "wrongful" under the first Restatement factor.
Consideration of the other six factors, however-particularly the media's
and society's interest-ultimately should render such conduct non-action-
able. Until then, plaintiffs will undoubtedly argue that affirmative induce-
ments, such as indemnification agreements or direct payments, warrant re-
lief.
Absent such inducements, the question remains as to whether it is im-
proper merely to question a source who is known to be subject to a nondis-
closure agreement. In competitive situations, defendants have been held
liable for "mere persuasion" under certain circumstances."° Nevertheless,
because liability for the simple act of persuasion turns on the actor's motive
and on the other Restatement factors, a similar result should not occur in the
newsgathering context. When an alleged interferer does not have an improp-
er motive for inducing the breach and acts to advance a favored societal
interest, courts have found persuasion insufficient to impose liability."
Conversely, where the defendant is motivated by a desire to harm the plain-
tiff or to benefit at the expense of the plaintiff, simple persuasion may be
sufficient."' Therefore, because reporters who legitimately seek to obtain a
106 Id.
107 Id. at *14.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. k (1979) (observing that "[t]he
inducement may be any conduct conveying to the third person the actor's desire to
influence him not to deal with the other"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at
982-83 (noting that "the defendant may be held even for peaceable persuasion" so long
as the interference is deemed "'improper' under the circumstances").
109 See, e.g., National Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Friends of Bryan, 741
F. Supp. 807, 814 (D. Nev. 1990) (holding that sending letter to inform radio and tele-
vision stations of purported inaccuracies in plaintiff's political advertisements not im-
proper); Silverman v. Caplin, 541 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547-48 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that
claim that wife intentionally persuaded her husband to breach partnership agreement did
not allege improper interference).
110 See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Chicago, 700 F. Supp. 917, 920 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(finding valid a claim by police officer alleging that he was terminated by secondary
employer because his sergeant spoke to the employer regarding an internal affairs inves-
tigation that was conducted to punish officer for his political affiliation and speech);
Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (Va. 1985) (holding that a non-defamatory letter
from architect to city council about obsessive competitor that was designed to enrich
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news story act to advance a favored societal interest instead of their self-
interest, they should not be subject to liability for asking questions, even of
those known to be bound by confidentiality agreements.
The Restatement also suggests that conducting one's business in the
usual manner is not restricted, even if the defendant knows of the existing
contract with plaintiff."1 Ordinary advertising and solicitation of business
is an example of unrestricted behavior. Seemingly corollary behavior in the
newsgathering context would involve seeking potential sources of informa-
tion. Furthermore, the extent to which the defendant's behavior comports
with the customs or practices of the industry should also be considered in an
evaluation of the actor's conduct.112 Under this analysis, too, asking ques-
tions and engaging in traditional newsgathering activities should not weigh
in favor of liability, even under the first factor.
Finally, as with any tort, there must be a showing that the actor's con-
duct caused the breach. As a general matter, the defendant must-have played
at least a significant part in "inducing" the breach." 3 This requirement is
not met in those cases in which a source approaches a reporter or in cases
which a source planned to breach the confidentiality agreement regardless of
any action by the reporter."'
b. "Motive"
The only clear rule regarding the motive factor is that common law
malice is not required in the commercial context. The defendant need not
engage in interference maliciously or with ill will toward the plaintiff.'15
architect at expense of competitor was sufficient to support liability).
.. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. m.
112 Id. § 766 cmt. j; see also C.W. Dev. Inc. v. Structures, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 41, 44
(W. Va. 1991) (holding that the established standards of a profession provide a means
of evaluating conduct).
113 See Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp., 916 F.2d 820, 828 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 907 (1991); Bryce v. Wilde, 333 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (App. Div.), aff'd,
292 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1972); KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 989 ("defendant
must be shown to have caused the interference and the loss ... [or] played an active
and substantial part in the loss").
114 See, e.g., Guity v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 740 F. Supp. 484, 488 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) (holding that conduct of investigator in obtaining information allegedly in viola-
tion of a hospital's duty of confidentiality to its patients could not be considered the
proximate cause of breach where contacts were initiated by the source and confidential
information was provided willingly and without inducement), aff'd, 904 F.2d 707 (6th
Cir. 1990); Tomson v. Stephan, 696 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (D. Kan. 1988) (finding cau-
sation element not met where party to confidentiality agreement "decided for himself to
make the disclosure without [defendant's] urging" or "encouragement").
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. r; KEETON ET AL., supra note
14, § 129, at 979, 983.
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Certainly, however, evidence of spite or ill will carries great weight in a
court's balancing of factors: "there has been general agreement that a purely
malicious motive, in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to the plain-
tiff for its own sake, will make the defendant liable for interference with a
contract."
116
To a large extent, inquiry into "motives" blends into the inquiry into
justification for, or "interests" served by, the interference in question. "The
propriety of an actor's motives in a particular setting necessarily depends on
the attending circumstances, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case ba-
sis.1 .. According to the Restatement,
the factor of motive is concerned with the issue of whether
the actor desired to bring about the interference as the sole
or a partial reason for his conduct while the factor of the
actor's interest is concerned with the individual and social
value or significance of any interests that he is seeking to
promote.18
Tortious interference probably will not be found where the defendant
acts with "an impersonal or disinterested motive of a laudable charac-
ter."'1 Such motives include protecting a person for whom the defendant
has responsibility, namely, an agent protecting the interests of a principal;
protecting the public interest by "removing a danger to public health or mor-
als"; and giving bona fide advice to withdraw from a contractual rela-
tionship."2 "Laudable" motives, however, may not function as a "trump
card" defeating liability. Liability may still be found in instances in which
"the steps taken are ... unreasonable in view of the harm threatened."' 21
Thus, wrongful conduct may render even proper motives actionable.
122
When a reporter is motivated by a desire to obtain information of public
concern and harbors no ill will or spite toward the employer, an employee's
breach of a confidentiality agreement should be considered incidental to the
goal of gathering newsworthy information. According to the Restatement,
116 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 984; see, e.g., Advanced Power Sys. v.
Hi-Tech Sys., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1450, 1460 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
17 G.S. Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1363, 1370 (Mass. 1991).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d.
119 KEE rON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 985.
120 Id.
121 Id.
" See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 551-
52 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that "[i]f... [defendants'] activities went beyond mere per-
suasion and included threats, we do not think that the purity of their motivations would
shield them from liability"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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if there is no desire at all to accomplish the interference and
it is brought about only as a necessary consequence of the
conduct of the actor engaged in for an entirely different
purpose, his knowledge of this makes the interference inten-
tional, but the factor of motive carries little weight toward
producing a determination that the interference was improp-
er.
123
Applying this principle, the court in Dulgarian v. Stone"A dismissed an
action for tortious interference based upon an investigative report about
conflicts of interest among local businesses because "[t]here [was] no indi-
cation that the report was broadcast for any reason other than the reporting
on an issue of public concern."'" Similarly, in Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. Jacobson,'26 the Seventh Circuit dismissed a claim for in-
terference with potential customers because, by plaintiff's own admission,
the purpose of the broadcast was "solely to increase the audience ratings of
and attract attention to" a television station, not to harm the defendant. 7
c. The Interests of the Other with Which the Actor's Conduct Interferes
The third Restatement factor recognizes that certain contractual interests
receive greater protection than others."2 Although the focus is primarily
on the nature of the contractual relationship-existing contract as opposed to
prospective contractual relations-this factor also permits consideration of
the contract's subject matter. 29 Thus, "the fact that a contract violates pub-
lic policy ... or that its performance will enable the party complaining of
the interference to maintain a condition that shocks the public conscience,
may justify an inducement of breach that, in the absence of this fact, would
be improper."'"3 Both the contractual interest and the actor's interest are to
be appraised in light of the social interests that would be advanced by their
protection.1
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1979).
124 652 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1995).
,23 Id. at 609.
'2 713 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1983).
127 Id. at 274; cf Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Assocs., 520 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 (Sup. Ct.
1987) (barring claim where interference "was merely incidental to defendants' exercise
of their constitutional rights").
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. e (1979).
129 Id.
0 Id. (citation omitted).
131 Id. § 767 cmt. f.
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d. The Actor's Interest and the Social Interest
The fourth and fifth factors address the interests the actor seeks to fur-
ther by his conduct and the "social utility" of those interests. Courts recog-
nize that under certain circumstances, the interference with the contract of
another may be justified, or privileged. The third party is so "privileged"
when he is acting to protect a conflicting interest that is considered to be of
a value equal to or greater than the plaintiff's contractual rights.
132
An actor may also be privileged to interfere with a contract when he is
acting to promote a public interest.' In Brownsville Golden Age Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Wells," the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
the defendants-including a United States Senator-who reported the condi-
tions of a nursing home to state and federal regulators.'35 The court held
that "[t]here can be no tortious action or impropriety when private citizens
or public officials exercise their rights to notify the appropriate agencies or
mobilize public opinion about a serious violation of the law."'36 Similarly,
a federal district court held that a letter sent by a political action committee
to all Nevada television and radio stations urging them not to run another
committee's allegedly inaccurate advertisements was not actionable as an
interference with the latter committee's advertising contracts, noting that an
interference judgment against the defendant committee would impermissibly
infringe upon its free speech rights.'37
132 Id. § 767 cmt. g; see, e.g., Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983)
(examining social benefit of promoting or deterring the communication of good faith
views about the merits of a literary work to publishers and book clubs), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 938 (1984); Raczkowski v. City of Chicago, 491 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (holding that co-worker has a qualified privilege to interfere with the employment
of another so long as the interferer is acting in accord with the interests of the employ-
er).
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f; see also Heheman v. E.W.
Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that public interest furthered by
joint operating agreement between newspapers justifies actions of one party to interfere
with lifetime employment contracts of printers of other party by using its own printers),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); MLI Indus., Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev.
Corp., 613 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding interference justified by the
need to ensure that public funds were used in a manner consistent with public policy of
the state); Stratford Materials Corp. v. Jones, 499 N.Y.S.2d 172 (App. Div. 1986) (find-
ing no liability for interference with contract to supply cast-iron manhole covers to
county agency where officials acted to protect the public interest in safe construction),
appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1987).
.34 839 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1988).
135 Id. at 159.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 National Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Friends of Bryan, 741 F. Supp.
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The Restatement identifies a series of questions relevant to situations in
which an actor claims to be protecting the public interest:
whether the practices are actually being used by the other,
whether the actor actually believes that the practices are
prejudicial to the public interest, whether his belief is reason-
able, whether he is acting in good faith for the protection of
the public interest, whether the contractual relation involved
is incident or foreign to the continuance of the practices and
whether the actor employs wrongful means to accomplish the
result.131
Certain established privileges are set forth in sections 770 through 774 of
the Restatement. Of particular interest are sections 770 and 774, which pro-
vide, respectively, that the actions of one who is responsible for the welfare
of another, and the actions of one who interferes with an agreement that is
illegal or contrary to public policy, are privileged acts.
139
Whether the alleged interference is analyzed under the rubric of justifi-
cation or in terms of its propriety, the focus of the inquiry is whether the
societal interest furthered by the breach-in this context, the substantial
interest in the gathering and dissemination of news presumably of public
interest---outweighs the interest of the other party in maintaining the secrecy
of the information through the confidentiality agreement.
14
e. Proximity or Remoteness of Actor's Conduct to Interference
This factor focuses on whether the interference was direct-A induces B
to breach his contract with C--or indirect-B's failure to perform causes C
to breach his contract with D. Generally, a party who engages in "indirect"
interference is less likely to be found liable under the tort.'
f. Relations Between the Parties
The final factor evaluates the significance of the relationship between
any two of the three parties.' Analysis of this factor considers, among
other things, whether the relationship between the third party and the injured
party arises from a prospective contract or an existing contract, whether the
807, 817 (D. Nev. 1990).
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f (1979).
139 Id. §§ 770, 774.
I4 d. § 767 cmt. g.
141 Id. § 767 cmt. h.
142 Id. § 767 cmt. i.
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alleged interferer and the injured party are competitors, and whether the
alleged interferer owes a duty to the third party that justifies inducement of
the breach.'43
3. Interplay of the Common Law Factors in the Newsgathering Context
As the above discussion reveals, there is significant overlap among the
factors to be considered in assessing the propriety of an alleged interference
on common law grounds. The confusion is compounded by the tendency of
courts to blend the various factors in reaching a determination. Under any
approach, however, there are compelling arguments against the imposition of
any liability for breach of a confidentiality agreement that results from a
reporter's otherwise legal efforts to obtain information for the purpose of
reporting the news.
Indeed, it can be argued that the public and constitutional interests in the
free flow of information are so substantial that they outweigh any interest in
confidentiality asserted to support a contractual interference claim. Under a
Restatement analysis, however, in all likelihood the public interest will be
weighed against the interest claimed by the other party, the conduct of the
press in obtaining the information, and the motives of all involved. Infor-
mation that is protected as a matter of policy to advance larger interests of
society, such as commercially valuable trade secrets, attorney-client com-
munications, and sensitive, personal information, will produce a different
balancing of factors than information concerning threats to the public health
or safety, wrong-doing, or corruption, the disclosure of which present dif-
ferent social interests. Similarly, a breach resulting from a reporter asking
questions of a source may be given different weight by the courts than a
breach resulting from conduct such as large payments to a source, agree-
ments to indemnify a source for the breach, or the conferring of other seem-
ingly significant benefits conferred on the breaching party. Yet, the interplay
of all the factors, where newsgathering is involved, must be undertaken with
full recognition of the significant state and federal public and constitutional
interests involved." These interests should defeat liability even under the
traditional common law analysis in most cases involving newsgathering.
First Amendment interests have previously been weighed by courts to
preclude liability for tortious interference in a number of contexts. 45 Tor-
tious interference claims based on publication, for example, have been
143 Id.
'" While this Article does not specifically address the authority analyzing and apply-
ing state law protections for newsgathering and publishing, they not only exist, but have
been held in other contexts to afford protection beyond that afforded by the federal
Constitution. See, e.g., Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
145 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 988-89.
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soundly rejected as an end-run around constitutional limits to liability based
on free speech.'46 As the Seventh Circuit noted:
Any libel of a corporation can be made to resemble in a
general way this archetypal wrongful-interference case, for
the libel will probably cause some of the corporation's cus-
tomers to cease doing business with it; and whether this
involves an actual breaking of contracts or merely a with-
drawal of prospective business would make no difference
under the modern law of wrongful interference. But this
approach would make every case of defamation of a corpora-
tion actionable as wrongful interference, thereby enabling the
plaintiff to avoid the specific limitations with which the law
of defamation-presumably to some purpose-is hedged
about. We doubt that the Illinois courts would allow this end
run around their rules on defamation, and we therefore need
not consider any constitutional implications of their doing
SO. 147
146 See Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 362 (D.
Colo. 1987); Taylor v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
147 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273-74 (7th Cir.
1983).
A related policy argument exists under the Restatement to limit the assertion of
liability for interference with prospective customers based on a publication. The press,
as surrogate for the public, acts in furtherance of a duty to another when it engages in
newsgathering. The Restatement recognizes that
[olne who, charged with responsibility for the welfare of a third person, intention-
ally causes that person not to perform a contract or enter into a prospective con-
tractual relation with another, does not interfere improperly with the other's rela-
tion if the actor ... does not employ wrongful means and ... acts to protect the
welfare of the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979). This rule is frequently applied to
those who stand in a fiduciary relation toward another, as in the case of agents acting
for the protection of their principals, trustees acting for their beneficiaries or corporate
officers acting for the benefit of their corporation. Id. § 770, cmt. b; see Waldinger
Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
architects have a privilege to breach contract if it is necessary to protect the interest of
their principal); Swager v. Couri, 395 N.E.2d 921, 927-29 (Ill. 1979) (discussing corpo-
rate officer privilege); Schott v. Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Il. App. Ct. 1982) (dis-
cussing attorney privilege).
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The First Amendment right to petition'48 has also been held to fore-
close liability for common law tortious interference.'49 The reasoning un-
derlying these decisions is that the First Amendment right to petition out-
weighs the plaintiff's contract rights or any harm resulting from the inter-
ference.15 °
Similarly, newsgathering is an activity of constitutional significance. The
Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that restrictions on newsgathering
raise First Amendment concerns because "[w]ithout some protection for
seeking out the news freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' '51 In-
deed, without protection for newsgathering, the value of Constitutional pro-
tection afforded publication would be severely diminished. Thus, as ex-
pressed in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,12 the First Amend-
ment "goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of indi-
viduals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw."'53
Because a necessary prerequisite to publishing the news is gathering it,
lower courts repeatedly have recognized that constitutional protection of
newsgathering is necessary to avoid media self-censorship and to preserve
an unimpeded flow of information to the public.'54 In Nicholson v.
148 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"4 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926-32 (1982); Beverly
Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 655, 39 F.3d
191, 196-97 (8th Cir. 1994); Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 650-
51 (7th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 482 F. Supp.
514, 524-25 (D. Minn. 1979), affd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v. Butz,
349 F. Supp. 934, 936-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
"s See, e.g., Hotel St. George Assocs. v. Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that "[a] claim of tortious interference cannot be made where,
as here, defendants' First Amendment right to petition government outweighs the harm
that their actions may have produced indirectly"); see also Beverly Hills Foodland, 39
F.3d at 196-97 (rejecting interference claim of union's constitutionally protected
pamphleteering and boycott of grocery store); Missouri v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301,
1317 (8th Cir.) (holding that First Amendment right to petition was of such importance
that NOW boycott of all states that had not ratified ERA could not support claim for
interference), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Rudoff v. Huntington Symphony Or-
chestra, Inc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (App. Term 1977) ("[p]laintiff's right to petition
his government is privileged and is superior to defendant's right to maintain an action
for interference"); Searle v. Johnson, 709 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah 1985) (holding that Hu-
mane Society media campaign to discourage tourists from visiting county to increase
public awareness of conditions at dog pound was protected by First Amendment, there-
by defeating claim for tortious interference).
'1 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
152 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
153 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing First Amendment protection for newsgathering); In re Express News
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McClatchy Newspapers,155 a California appellate court recognized that "the
newsgathering component of the freedom of the press-the right to seek out
information-is privileged at least to the extent it involves 'routine...
reporting techniques' [which] include asking persons questions, including
those [persons] with confidential or restricted information." '156 The plain-
tiffs in McClatchy sued for, among other things, intrusion arising out of a
newspaper's investigation of a judicial candidate.'57 The allegedly offend-
ing conduct included "soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading
agents, employees and members of the [state bar] to engage in the unautho-
rized and unlawful disclosure of information."'58 The court found such
conduct to constitute newsgathering activity protected by the First Amend-
ment and, as such, non-tortious: "For the same reason 'liability cannot be
imposed on any theory for what has been determined to be a constitutionally
protected publication,' it cannot be imposed for constitutionally protected
newsgathering."'59
Through its several access decisions, the Supreme Court has also ac-
knowledged that First Amendment interests are at stake in newsgathering.
The Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional dimension of the right
of access in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,60 stating:
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations
concerning them as a "right of access" or a "right to gather
information," for we have recognized that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.'
61
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens underscored that Richmond News-
papers was "a watershed case,"'162 because "for the first time, the Court
unequivocally [held] that an arbitrary interference with access to important
Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Allen v. Combined Communica-
tions Corp., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417, 2419 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1981) (stating
that because newsgathering is inseparable from news publication courts should "open
the umbrella of the First Amendment to all of th[o]se activities which are necessary to
the publication of [a] news story").
,5 Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Ct. App. 1986).
156 Id. at 64 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1978)).
157 Id. at 58-59.
158 Id. at 64.
159 Id. at 65 (quoting Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Synanon Church, 690 P.2d 610,
624 (Cal. 1984)).
's" 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
161 Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
162 Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment.' ' 63 Although the holdings of the Su-
preme Court's subsequent access cases focus primarily on the role of the
press in monitoring the manner in which the government functions, these
cases nevertheless demonstrate the importance of ensuring that the press is
not unreasonably restricted in its ability to fulfill its role as an important
source of information for the public."6'
Under the Restatement formulation, the First Amendment policies articu-
lated in Branzburg, Bellotti, and Richmond Newspapers should serve to de-
feat liability against the press for tortious interference with a confidentiality
agreement, absent some independently wrongful conduct. Although appar-
ently no appellate court has yet addressed this issue directly, two recent
New York trial court decisions support this conclusion. These decisions
arose out of separate actions brought by Melba Moore's former husband
against media organizations that broadcast statements made by Ms. Moore
in violation of a confidentiality agreement with her former spouse that
barred either party from publicly criticizing or otherwise disparaging the
other. In both actions, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants induced his
wife to violate the confidentiality agreement. The claims were based on both
the breach of the agreement and the subsequent publication. In Huggins v.
Whitney,165 the trial court dismissed the claim, holding that the defendants'
First Amendment rights outweighed the harm that the plaintiff had suffered
by virtue of the breach.'66 The court found that the First Amendment
barred liability because media organizations cannot be liable or punished for
the use of "'routine newspaper reporting techniques"' to ascertain and pub-
lish a newsworthy story.'67 In Huggins v. National Broadcasting Co.,1"
the court dismissed the tortious interference claim because "[a]ny interfer-
ence that occurred was merely incidental to defendants' exercise of their
constitutional right to broadcast information.' '169 The court further held that
"[d]efendants purpose was a legitimate one and did not involve an intent to
unjustifiably interfere with the confidentiality agreement."'70
Similarly, although not involving a typical confidentiality agreement, a
tortious interference claim was dismissed in Wells v. Marton,7' a case in
Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (holding
that right of access applies to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California).
165 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1088 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 1995).
166 See id. at 1091.
167 Id. at 1090 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)).
16 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1996, at 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 1996).
169 Id.
170 Id.
17' 794 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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which the reporter's sole objective was to gather and disseminate newswor-
thy information. In Wells, a reporter interviewed a Hungarian politician, Dr.
Antall, for the magazine Vanity Fair.'72 The plaintiff sued on a theory of
tortious interference, claiming that a contractual relationship with Dr. Antall
gave him exclusive interview rights for the purposes of writing a biogra-
phy.' The court dismissed the claim on summary judgment in large part
because the reporter's "sole interest" was to disseminate news regarding
Hungary's current political climate and because she had no intention to
interfere with any contractual interest that Wells had in Dr. Antall's life
story.74
Although these three cases do not extensively explore the interplay of
the Restatement factors where newsgathering is involved, they do demon-
strate that the constitutional interest in the protection of newsgathering and
reporting should weigh heavily against liability under several of the factors,
including those requiring an assessment of a reporter's motive, the interests
a reporter seeks to advance, and the societal interests involved. Moreover,
the protection of newsgathering safeguards the process of ferreting out and
reporting the news. Thus, it can be argued that the factors weighing against
the imposition of interference liability for newsgathering should not turn on
the importance of the particular story being reported. If the focus is properly
on the protection of the process, newsgathering in pursuit of a routine story
should be as protected as newsgathering in pursuit of significant threats to
the public health or safety. Again, extremely limited precedent supports this
conclusion: Huggins rejected liability for disclosure of marital information;
Wells involved a fairly routine magazine interview on the political climate in
Hungary.
Under the common law approach, however, First Amendment
protections may not be an absolute bar to liability for tortious interference.
The Second Circuit, for example, has held that the right to petition does not
insulate interfering conduct when it is designed to achieve an unlawful ob-
jective. 75 Conduct that would be independently actionable-fraud, bribery,
and illegal entry, for example-may still be considered improper under the
Restatement even if done in pursuit of news.7 Other actions, such as pay-
ment of money for information, also could constitute such actionable wrong-
172 Id. at 1097-98.
173 Id. at 1093.
174 Id. at 1097.
175 See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council, 968 F.2d 286,
296-98 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that no First Amendment protection exists where defen-
dant induced country club to cancel a contract for a discriminatory purpose).
176 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. Although conduct may be "im-
proper," this does not always lead to the conclusion that liability exists for tortious
interference. There still must be a weighing of all factors in the context giving rise to
the improper actions.
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doing in some settings. 177 Nevertheless, the permissible range of conduct
connected to newsgathering has never been tested in court.
In the commercial context, indemnification against liability for breach of
the underlying contract is generally considered improper, but even in that
context it does not automatically produce liability under circumstances
where the indemnity is offered to protect a proper interest. 78 Where
newsgathering is involved, the First Amendment principles that necessarily
must be considered under many of the Restatement factors dictate against
liability for indemnification in ways not present when a commercial tort is
at issue. These issues, however, are also untested.
In short, the several significant constitutionally protected interests ad-
vanced by the press when it engages in legitimate newsgathering indicate
that, under the Restatement approach, tort liability is not properly imposed
in most circumstances. So long as the press acts for the purpose of reporting
the news and does not engage in independently wrongful conduct, there
should be no liability under a common law analysis.
C. Proximately Caused Damages
Another required element of recovery is, of course, proof of damages. In
the case of a breach of confidentiality agreement, the permissible measure of
damages may present several significant questions.
There is authority limiting damages for interference to those damages
that could be recovered against the contract breacher on the underlying con-
tract.179 Most jurisdictions, however, including New York, Texas, Illinois,
and California, recognize the more generous "tort measure" of damages,
under which general pecuniary and consequential damages are available, as
well as, in certain circumstances, punitive damages, recovery for emotional
distress or reputational harm, and the equitable remedies of injunction and
restitution.' Many of these jurisdictions have either explicitly or implicit-
ly adopted Restatement § 774A, which states in relevant part:
One who is liable to another for interference with a contract
or prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or
the prospective relation;
'n See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00-.45 (Consol. 1984) (defining criminal brib-
ery).
178 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
179 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 1003.
'-" Id. § 129, at 1004. "There is obviously an anomaly in making the defendant liable
for a greater sum than that for which the contracting party himself can be held." id.
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(b) consequential losses for which the interference is the
legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if
they are reasonably to be expected to result from the
interference.' 1
The Restatement and case law also demonstrate that the availability of a
remedy against the contract breacher is no bar to an action against the inter-
ferer, but that damages actually paid by one will be offset against those
recoverable against the other.1
2
1. General (Pecuniary) Damages
The measure of general damages for tortious interference with contract
is the difference between the price of the contract and the value of the per-
formance to be received.'83 The most common use of this measure is in
sales contracts, in which a breaching seller pays the difference between the
contract price and the market price, and services contracts, in which a work-
er discharged earlier than as provided by the contract recovers the difference
between what he or she has been paid and the total that was to have been
paid.' Given that the goal of this measure of damages is to give to the
plaintiff the profit he or she would have earned upon performance," 5 its
relevance seems limited in the context of a news organization that induces
an employee to disclose information in violation of a confidentiality agree-
ment. Absent publication, courts would likely dismiss as hopelessly spec-
ulative an attempt to measure the profit a company would have made had its
employee remained silent. There may be, however, alternate measures of
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 744A (1979). For cases that have applied
the measure of damages spelled out in the Restatement, see, e.g., Tose v. First Pa.
Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Allied Int'l
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1384 (1st Cir. 1981), aff'd, 456
U.S. 212 (1982); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 274 (4th Cir.
1980); Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D. Mass. 1980);
Bean v. Johnson, 649 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ark. 1983); Ross v. Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166,
173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406
N.E.2d 445, 452, (N.Y. 1980); Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., 634 P.2d 1333, 1335
(Or. 1981); Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., 652 P.2d 852, 856 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); John-
son v. Schmitt, 309 N.W.2d 838, 841 (S.D. 1981); Boyles v. Thompson, 585 S.W.2d
821, 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(2); see, e.g., International Minerals &
Resources, Inc. v. Pappas, 761 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
'" See, e.g., Crummer v. Zalk, 57 Cal. Rptr. 185, 187 (Ct. App. 1967).
'84 See 3 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.2(1) (2d ed. 1993).
185 3 id.
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damages available to the employer. For example, courts have held that a
plaintiff may recover from the defendant any profits earned as a result of
the interference.
18 6
2. Damages for Harm to Reputation
In the commercial context, the Restatement specifically provides that a
tortious interferer is liable for "actual harm to reputation, if [it is] reason-
ably to be expected to result from the interference..'.. Nevertheless, any
attempt, at least by a public figure or official, to recover reputational damag-
es for tortious interference arising out of publication should be required to
meet the requirements of a defamation claim-falsity and fault.' 1a In Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,1"9 an operator of food supermarkets
sued a television network after the network conducted an undercover investi-
gation of the supermarket, and broadcast the results, which were highly
critical of Food Lion." Food Lion did not sue for defamation. Instead, it
alleged that the network had committed fraud, trespass, and other wrongful
acts that arose out of the surreptitious means employed to gather the infor-
mation for the report.' In addressing whether reputational damages were
available under the torts alleged, the court turned to the Supreme Court's
holding in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell'" and determined that the
plaintiff was attempting to recover reputational damages without meeting the
requirements of a defamation claim.'93 The court thus found that, just as in
Falwell, reputation damages under the interference tort could be awarded
only if the plaintiff established the additional elements of actual malice and
' See, e.g., Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575,
582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 775-76
(Mass. 1976).
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 744(1)(c) (1979) (emphasis added).
1 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Food Lion, Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 822-24 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Courts have con-
sistently refused to allow plaintiffs to use tortious interference as an end run around the
constitutional and other requirements of libel laws, and various lower courts have ap-
plied the principles from Falwell to private figures. See, e.g., Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d
300, 304 (8th Cir. 1988); Tackett v. KRIV-TV, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2092, 2093-94
(S.D. Tex. May 5, 1994); Salek v. Passaic Collegiate Sch., 605 A.2d 276, 278-79 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
189 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
190 Id. at 812.
191 Id.
192 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Food Lion, 887 F.Supp. at 823.
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falsity.14 The court supported this conclusion by distinguishing Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. :195
[1]t appears that in determining that the First Amendment
does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovery for a defendant's
violation of a generally applicable law, the Cohen Court was
mindful of the type of damages that the plaintiff sought to
recover. Where a plaintiff sought recovery for non-
reputational or non-state of mind injuries, the Cohen Court
indicated that such a plaintiff could recover these damages
without offending the First Amendment. Where, however, a
plaintiff seeks to use a generally applicable law to recover
for injury to reputation or state of mind while avoiding the
requirements of a defamation claim ... the Cohen holding
does not appear to be applicable.'96
3. Consequential Damages
A plaintiff also may seek "consequential losses for which the interfer-
ence is a legal cause.'. 97 The gauge of such damages is "the amount nec-
essary to put [the plaintiff] in as good a position as it would have had if its
agreement ... had been performed."'98 Whether the interference is indeed
the proximate cause of the loss is determined according to the normal rules
applicable in tort actions.'99
A common type of consequential damages at issue in the tortious inter-
ference context is lost profits. Generally, "an injured party may recover
damages for lost profits by showing that the loss is a natural and probable
result of the act or omission complained of and that the amount of profits
that the party would have earned is reasonably certain."'
194 Id. at 824.
195 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
'9 Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822-23.
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(b) (1979).
19' Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
jury instructions and applying New York law), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
"9 See, e.g., Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445,
452 (N.Y. 1980) ("In an action ... for tortious interference,... the elements of dam-
ages, including consequential damages, would be those recognized under the more liber-
al rules applicable to tort actions").
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 852 S.W.2d 540, 549-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992),
rev'd, 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1993); see also American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527
F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that, in breach of restrictive covenant in em-
ployment contract, plaintiff could not recover speculative damages); Orchid Software,
Inc. v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the general
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In the newsgathering context, employers are likely to seek lost profits
and other economic losses allegedly resulting from the subsequent publica-
tion of information obtained by virtue of the breach of confidentiality. The
measure of such damages, however, is virtually identical to reputational
damages-the business lost as a result of the report. As such, any attempt
by a public official or public figure to recover damages separately resulting
from publication of the information, regardless of the label given to these
damages, should be subject to the Falwell defamation requirements of actual
malice and falsity. Otherwise, an employer would be permitted to evade the
standard for reputational damages by attempting to designate such losses as
consequential damages."z '
4. Punitive Damages
Assuming that intentional interference with contract has been estab-
lished, most jurisdictions permit punitive damages in commercial cases on
the same basis as for other torts if the interference was accomplished
through especially improper means or for improper motives.2' 2 The mental
state generally required to recover punitive damages is common law malice,
spite, or ill-will."3 Courts generally have held that punitive damages may
not be awarded absent a finding of compensatory damages,' 4 although
some authority supports allowing an award of punitive damages even if the
plaintiff shows only nominal damages.2 5
Plaintiffs may be able to recover punitive damages if a defendant induc-
es breach of a fiduciary duty or a contract designed to protect a fiduciary
duty .' This is particularly relevant in a suit for tortious interference with
employment contracts containing noncompetition covenants. Noncompetition
rule that loss must be a natural and probable result and amount must be reasonably cer-
tain).
"' But see Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 840 & n.2 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1979) (suggesting, in dicta, that diminution of customer patronage and sales
resulting from publication of information obtained by trespass may properly be recov-
ered).
' See, e.g., Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1994); Ramona Manor
Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enters., 225 Cal. Rptr. 120, 132 (Ct. App. 1986). But see
Association Research & Dev. Corp. v. CNA Fin. Corp., 333 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983), appeal denied, 419 Mich. 881 (1984); Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d at 863-66; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. a (1979).
203 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 2, at 9-10.
2 Id. § 2, at 14-15.
205 Id. § 2, at 14.
2o6 See, e.g., Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979)
(awarding punitive damages when employee breached fiduciary duty to employer by
using employer's customer list).
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covenants often are devices designed to protect trade secrets and other con-
fidential information and, as such, are considered to be rooted in the concept
of fiduciary duty.2" The fiduciary duty usually prohibits an agent from not
using the principal's information to reap an economic opportunity through,
for example, the use of a trade secret.2"' If a court finds an organization
liable for inducing the disclosure of confidential information, it may be
argued that the organization induced the breach of a fiduciary duty. On this
theory, the defendant arguably could be subject to punitive damages even if
the information did no particular pecuniary harm to the plaintiff.
Whether this outcome is appropriate in a commercial context, when
liability is based on newsgathering activity or the publication of information,
however, independent reasons argue against the propriety of punitive damag-
es, based upon the constitutional interests at stake. As the Supreme Court
noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2' imposition of punitive damag-
es for constitutionally protected activity can pose a severe problem because
it is "'a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms mark-
edly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.""'21 The
Court subsequently warned that punitive damages could defeat First Amend-
ment interests by giving juries the discretion to selectively "punish expres-
sions of unpopular views ' and to award punitive damages in "wholly
unpredictable amounts." '212 Commentators also have recognized that the
arbitrary nature of punitive damages substantially increases the danger of
self-censorship by the press.213 All of these arguments apply to punitive
damages imposed for newsgathering and may be marshalled to attack the
permissibility of such awards in the newsgathering context. The Supreme
Court itself has thus far explicitly left open "the proposition that punitive,
damages, despite their historical sanction, can violate the First Amend-
ment. ,2
14
5. Injunctive Relief
Courts have granted injunctive relief to prevent a tortious interference in
the commercial context. For example, when interference with contract takes
207 Id. at 90.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1958).
2- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
210 Id. at 278 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
211 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Com-
munications Law, Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, RECORD OF ASS'N OF B. OF CITY
OF N.Y., Jan./Feb. 1987, at 20, 29.
214 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
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the form of an injurious falsehood or trade libel, some jurisdictions will
approve the injunction despite the resulting impact on speech."' Even in
the commercial context, however, authority exists to forbid injunctions when
the harm sought to be enjoined involves reputational harm.2" In the media
context, any effort to enjoin the publication of information obtained through
interference with a confidentiality agreement is subject to First Amendment
scrutiny because it is a prior restraint.2"7 Courts have issued injunctions
restraining publication to protect certain specific business interests such as
trade secrets, copyrights, and trademarks.21 Nevertheless, with the excep-
tion of such specific interests, courts repeatedly have held that the mere
allegation of harm to a business is insufficient to justify a prior restraint.2"9
A similar result should apply when the effort is to enjoin legitimate
newsgathering activities.
III. ARTICULATING A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE
The common law elements of tortious interference already mandate a
detailed consideration of the state and federal constitutional interests in-
volved when a claim is based upon newsgathering, the result of which
should preclude liability in most circumstances.22 Nonetheless, a distinct
First Amendment or state constitutional defense to tortious interference may
be articulated separately by media defendants. Although the Supreme Court,
in recent years, has demonstrated some reluctance to create new First
Amendment "defenses" to media liability, a defense to the tortious interfer-
ence tort should be recognized, especially because such a defense is rooted
in the Supreme Court's recent holdings.22" ' Moreover, the already strong
state common law restrictions that courts have recognized in connection
215 See, e.g., Lowe Excavating Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 535
N.E.2d 1065 (I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 541 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 975 (1989).
216 See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d
193, 200 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 91-92 (1974), for
the proposition that "damage to reputation 'falls far short of the type of irreparable inju-
ry which is a necessary predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction"').
217 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
218 See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d
1317 (2d Cir. 1987) (trademark); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987) (copyright); Garth v. Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d
545 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (trade secret).
219 See, e.g., Turner Advertising Co. v. National Serv. Corp. (In re Nat'l Serv.
Corp.), 742 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1984); Lloyd v. Alaska Worldwide, Inc., 550 S.W.2d
343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
See supra part 11.B.3.
z' See supra notes 148-53, 160-64 and accompanying text.
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with tortious interference... are closely related to the nearly universal state
constitutional interests in protecting free expression. The constitutional de-
fense, therefore, should be developed in response to any future effort to
expand tort liability to newsgathering.
Courts consistently have rejected attempts to impose liability for tortious
interference when plaintiffs use the tort to punish the exercise of otherwise
protected First Amendment rights. 23 Accordingly, the First Amendment al-
ready has been held to bar liability under this tort where the allegedly inter-
fering conduct consisted of the exercise of the right to petition.' The
First Amendment also prohibits recovery for tortious interference that alleg-
edly is the result of the publication of defamatory statements, requiring
plaintiffs instead to come within the constitutionally imposed strictures of
libel law.' A similar analysis should prohibit tortious interference liability
for newsgathering that results in the breach of a confidentiality obligation.
Newsgathering is an activity of constitutional significance.2" Imposing
liability for obtaining information from a source bound by an agreement to
remain silent would severely impair the press's ability to serve its constitu-
tional function by effectively cutting off vital sources of information.227
Tort liability would impair the flow of significant information just as effec-
tively as would denying access to judicial proceedings or compelling disclo-
sure of confidential sources or materials. The right of reporters to ask ques-
tions of potential sources-including those known to be subject to confiden-
tiality restrictions-is among the reporters' most basic functions and should
be protected under the First Amendment.
An issue to be addressed in pressing this constitutional defense arises
out of decisions which hold that the press has no blanket First Amendment
immunity from laws of general application.2" In Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., the Supreme Court noted the "well established line of decisions holding
that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
See supra parts II.A., Il.B.1-2.
See supra part II.B.3.
224 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Beverly Hills
Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 655, 39 F.3d 191
(8th Cir. 1994).
225 See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 362
(D. Colo. 1987), aft'd, 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. Nashville Banner Pub-
lishing Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979).
226 See supra part II.B.3.
227 See supra notes 151-70 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(copyright).
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ability to gather and report the news."229 Even before Cohen, courts widely
accepted that news organizations were liable for torts and crimes committed
in the process of gathering the news.23° But these principles should not
serve to defeat a First Amendment defense to tortious interference asserted
in the context of newsgathering.
The majority opinion in Cohen suggested the rationale for such a con-
clusion. In allowing the plaintiff to assert a claim against the press for
promissory estoppel, the Court explained that such generally applicable laws
"do not offend the First Amendment" when their "enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."' "I
Cohen presented just such a case of "incidental" effects." Indeed, enforc-
ing the press promise at issue in Cohen arguably would promote
newsgathering over the long term more effectively than would allowing the
promise to be broken. In any event, Justice White found that holding the
press responsible for a promise of confidentiality would result in a "no more
than incidental, and constitutionally insignificant" impact on newsgathering
and reporting. 3 When applied in the context of a nondisclosure agree-
ment, however, imposition of liability for tortious interference serves signif-
icantly to punish the act of newsgathering and, in some cases, would protect
no other legitimate interest of the plaintiff.2" In such situations, the impact
of expanding tort liability to newsgathering would not be "incidental" but
substantial and manifest.
If no independently wrongful conduct by the press is involved, the tort
applied to newsgathering would allow private individuals to attempt to regu-
late through agreements and then litigation the types of conduct that the
press may "properly" undertake and the types of stories the press may pur-
sue. If liability were allowed based on post hoc assessments of press con-
duct and the value of press objectives in pursuing a particular story, the
specter of damage claims likely would result in self-censorship by the press
and would impede the flow of information to the public. Application of the
tort to the media also could result in a proliferation of secrecy agreements
9 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (intrusion); Dietemann
v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (intrusion and emotional distress); Le Mis-
tral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (trespass); Stahl v. State,
665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069 (1984) (trespass).
231 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
232 Id. at 671-72 (finding that if "news organizations ... have legal incentives not to
disclose a confidential source's identity ... [the incentives are] no more than ... inci-
dental").
233 id. at 672.
23 To the extent that the plaintiff has a legitimate interest that has been damaged, he
may have a claim against the source and, in certain circumstances, against the media
based on any actionable content of the publication.
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and mandatory commitments from all employers aimed solely at foreclosing
disclosure of information to the press.
All of this suggests a further reason why this tort, if applied to
newsgathering, would violate the First Amendment. Central to the Cohen
holding rejecting a constitutional defense to a promissory estoppel claim was
the fact that "any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truth-
ful information are self-imposed," the scope of which were determined in
advance by the news organization and its source.235 The exact opposite is
true if liability may be imposed on newsgathering through a tortious inter-
ference claim. The restrictions are not self-imposed and may not even be
ascertainable in advance. Unlike trespass, bribery, and other torts, no rela-
tively clear standard allows a person to distinguish in advance permissible
conduct from impermissible conduct. Because a jury would decide only after
the fact if a reporter's conduct was "improper," if indeed the underlying
confidentiality agreement was enforceable, a reporter may never know in
advance what is allowed under a tortious interference theory of liability.
Indeed, even Prosser and Keeton recognize that the list of factors in the
Restatement would not "inspire one to predict an outcome, or decide one's
rights or duties."" The First Amendment does not permit such uncertainty
when otherwise protected activities are involved.
The interference tort is so "ill-defined" and "not reducible to a single
rule," 7 that it cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny when applied to
newsgathering activities of the press. If the provisions of a statute or regula-
tion are "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning," they are void for vagueness.23 The general test for vague-
ness applies with particular force when reviewing laws that deal with activi-
ty protected by the First Amendment.3 When "the law interferes with the
right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should
appiy." °
In Grayned v. City of Rockford," the Supreme Court explained the
policies underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the First Amendment
area. First, the Due Process Clause requires that an individual have adequate
advance warning that conduct is unlawful.242 Second, the mere existence of
23' Id. at 671.
236 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 984 n.63.
237 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, introductory note to ch. 37, at 5 (1979).
238 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See generally 1 NOR-
MAN DORSEN E7 AL., EMMERSON, HUBER, AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 54-55 (4th ed. 1976).
2'9 Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982).
1 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
22 Id. at 108.
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a vague standard of liability creates First Amendment concerns because it
will deter law-abiding citizens from conduct that may or may not be covered
by the law.243 When such conduct involves free speech, the chilling effect
of a vague proscription is an unacceptable price to pay. Finally, vague laws
involving First Amendment activity are not tolerated because they do not
provide enforcement officials, including jurors, with adequate guidance
concerning the precise scope of the prosecuted activity, vesting such offi-
cials with excessive discretion over whether to penalize a given act.'
These considerations compel the conclusion that a tortious interference
claim may not be asserted against newsgathering activity that is consistent
with the First Amendment. The elements of a tortious interference claim fail
to inform members of the press of the specific conduct that would render
them liable and afford impermissible discretion to jurors to sanction conduct
after the fact. Reporters likely would be overly cautious in the exercise of
their First Amendment rights if such liability could be asserted. Rather than
risk liability, reporters will refrain from pursuing sources who may be bound
by such agreements, and the flow of information to the public will be sub-
stantially impeded.
Moreover, when protected interests are burdened significantly, as in this
case, the tort can withstand constitutional scrutiny only if its adverse impact
is justified by some subordinating, valid governmental interest "of the high-
est order.". 45 A tortious interference claim based on newsgathering activity
seems unlikely to meet this test. Indeed, the Supreme Court already has
recognized a First Amendment defense to this tort in the context of the right
to petition. 6
CONCLUSION
The established common law elements required to assert a cause of
action and the constitutional defenses potentially available suggest that tor-
tious interference is unlikely to become a source of significant liability for
newsgathering. Even where a confidentiality agreement is found to be en-
forceable, potent defenses remain available to the media based on the sub-
stantial policies favoring the free flow of information. The common law
elements of the tort require courts to consider such interests in assessing
liability. In light of the public and constitutional interests at stake, the
243 Id. at 109.
' Id. at 108-09; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (hold-
ing unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring dismissal of faculty or other school
personnel for treasonous or seditious behavior).
"' Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979); see, e.g., Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430
U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
46 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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breach of a confidentiality agreement should not sustain a tortious interfer-
ence claim when the press is involved in newsgathering activity.
